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EXPLORING COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNITARIANIST 
EU CITIZENSHIP – AN ANALOGICAL READING1
Pablo Jiménez Lobeira
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Postnationalists like Habermas have suggested EU citizen-
ship as a way to overcome nationalisms, grounding political 
belonging on the body of laws that members of the post-
national polity generate in the public sphere. Cosmopolitan 
communitarianits like Bellamy think that EU citizens should 
form a mixed-commonwealth, with political belonging 
based on their nations. I will argue that the second option 
is more desirable and submit the analogical character of the 
ensuing ideas of citizenship, identity and polity. Cosmopoli-
tan communitarianist citizenship promises to better foster 
the great richness of European national cultural, religious, 
historical, political, legal and linguistic diversity while still 
maintaining a certain unity to form a ‘mixed’ polity.
Keywords: Analogical Language, Cosmopolitan Communitarianism, 
Citizenship, European Identity, Postnationalism
1  I am grateful to Lina Eriksson and John Besemeres for very valuable comments to 
both the text and the content. 
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Algunos posnacionalistas, como Habermas, han sugerido la 
ciudadanía europea como un camino para superar los nacio-
nalismos, fundamentando la pertenencia política en el cuer-
po de las leyes que los miembros de la política pos-nacional 
generen en el espacio público. Comunitaristas cosmopolitas 
como Bellamy, piensan que los ciudadanos de la UE deberían 
formar una mancomunidad mixta, en la que la pertenencia 
política esté basada en las naciones. Argumentaré que la se-
gunda opción es más deseable, y presentaré el carácter aná-
logo de algunas ideas posteriors de ciudadanía, identidad y 
política. El comunitarismo cosmopolita promete fundar de 
mejor manera la riqueza de la diversad europea: cultural, 
religiosa, histórica, política, legal y lingüística y, al mismo 
tiempo, mantener una cierta unidad para formar una polí-
tica mixta. 
Palabras clave????????????????????????????????????????????????
Ciudadanía, Identidad europea, Posnacionalismo
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The European motto2 established in year 2000 is: “[Europe] united 
in diversity”. In political terms, this means that Europe–or more 
precisely, the European Union (EU)–wishes to be one polity while 
maintaining and respecting the rich diversity of its members (states 
and citizens). Diversity is evident in aspects like culture, language, 
history, religion, geography, political traditions and so forth. But 
what can give Europe3 unity? 
The European Political Community failed in 1954. In 1970, Eu-
ropean Political Cooperation was introduced. In 1992 the European 
Community became part of the European 8QLRQ However enthu-
siasm for political integration among the population of the nascent 
EU was not great. Europe as a political project seemed to be ‘in 
crisis’ (Weiler: 1999, Cerutti: 2005). Some argued then and argue 
today that the crisis was not only political, but existential as well –
threatening the very foundations of Europe (Weiler: 1999, 238-263; 
2003; Weigel: 2005, Ratzinger & Pera: 2006, Ratzinger: 2007). 
These discussions posed questions such as ‘What is Europe?’, 
‘Where does Europe end?’, ‘Who can be considered a European?’, 
‘What do Europeans have in common?’ Questions of ‘European 
identity’. 
For Ratzinger, the work of European integration had two goals. The 
first one was to overcome the divisive nationalistic movements and 
hegemonic ideologies that had precipitated the II World War (Ratz-
inger: 2007, 35-46). The second was to present a unified front that 
?? ? ?????? ???????????? ????????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????? ??? ???????
as well.
3  Often in the present exposition I will have to follow the practice of mixing ‘Europe’ 
with ‘European Union’ as if they were interchangeable. I do not endorse this confusion. 
Yet some authors and even official documents use it. The European Union certainly 
encompasses more than half of the European countries, but still ‘European Union’ is not 
a synonym of ‘Europe’. Ukraine, Iceland and Croatia are as European as any member-
state of the EU. Some scholars have used the term ‘EUrope’ or ‘EUropean’ when they are 
referring to EU matters. The term is accurate but a little awkward. 
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served as a political counterbalance to the two great powers of the 
Cold War.  
The way of peace (first goal of integration) as the common iden-
tity of Europeans and the common path towards the future, was 
grounded on the common cultural, moral and religious heritage of 
Europe (ibid). They were seeking
…a European identity that would not dissolve or deny the 
national identities, but rather unite them at a higher level of 
unity into one community of peoples (Ratzinger: 2007, 36).
Central to that cultural, moral and religious heritage were Christi-
anity and the Enlightenment:
There is no doubt that among the founding fathers of Eu-
ropean unification the Christian heritage was considered 
the nucleus of this historical identity–of course, not in its 
denominational forms; what was common to all Christians, 
however, seemed to be discernible beyond the denomina-
tion boundaries as a unifying force for action in the secular 
world. It did not even appear to be incompatible with the 
great moral ideals of the Enlightenment, which had given 
prominence, so to speak, to the rational dimension of the 
Christian reality and, transcending all the historical opposi-
tions, certainly seemed to be compatible with the funda-
mental ideals of the Christian history of Europe (Ratzinger: 
2007, 36).  
This intuition, Ratzinger recognizes, has never been made clear and 
it demands a deeper study. Yet, reconciliation and unification of en-
emies would have not been possible without a common moral back-
ground, essential part of which, he claims, is Christianity. 
The second goal of integration, to create a political counterbalance 
in the world stage, demanded that Europeans became an economic 
power. This was where the common identity–founded on the moral 
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background that all Europeans shared–met with an affirmation of 
common interests as well (not RQO\However,
…[o]ver the course of the developments in the last fifty 
years, this second aspect of European unification has be-
come ever more dominant, almost exclusively influential. 
The common European currency is the clearest expression 
of this orientation in the work of European unification: Eu-
rope appears as an economic and monetary union, which as 
such participates in the formation of history and lays claim 
to a space of its own (Ratzinger: 2007, 37).
In sum, Ratzinger is bringing to discussion two ideas. The first one is 
that the common heritage shared by Europeans is based on Christi-
anity and the Enlightenment together. Both are components of Eu-
ropean identity, which is–if my interpretation is correct–not a na-
tional, strong identity of ‘the people’ of Europe, but a weaker form 
of identity of ‘the peoples’–the nations–of Europe. His second idea is 
that the project of European integration had, at the outset, two aims: 
reconciliation and reconstruction–peace and prosperity. Whenever 
one of the components of the common moral background (Chris-
tianity and Enlightenment) or one of the aims of integration (peace 
and prosperity) is forgotten, the project will suffer a crisis. We will 
return to these ideas later on. 
The debate, approached from disciplines as varied as sociology, 
social psychology, anthropology, history, theology or cultural stud-
ies, has become important to political philosophy too: the European 
project had from the start some form of political integration as one 
of its goals, and for many the EU is a new kind of polity.4 In 1973 for-
eign ministers of the ‘Nine’ member states of the European Commu-
nities issued the ‘Copenhagen Declaration on European identity’. In 
1999 the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission issued 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
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a Working Paper with ‘Reflections on European Identity’ (Jansen: 
1999). In 2001 the ‘Laeken Declaration on the future of the Euro-
pean Union’ was issued: it would lead to the ‘European Conven-
tion’ (2002-2003) that drafted the ‘Constitutional Treaty’ (rejected 
in 2005). 
Efforts to foster an EU identity–often perceived as lacking–have 
included the creation of ‘symbols’ such as a European Flag, a Eu-
ropean Anthem, a ‘Europe Day’, a European currency (the euro), 
a European motto and a ‘European citizenship’ (Jacobs & Maier, 
1998). In this paper I will focus on the last element. 
(8FLWL]HQVKLS	SROLWLFDOLGHQWLW\WKHdemos and telosSUREOHPV
Citizenship is the cornerstone of a democratic polity (Weiler: 1999, 
332). It provides a sense of belonging in a political community, rights 
derived from membership, and duties of participation in it (Leydet: 
2006). It has thus three dimensions: identitarian–sense of belong-
ing–, legal–rights (and duties)–and political–participation (Bellamy: 
2008b, 599). 
Citizens constitute the polity’s demos–its ‘people’–, which often 
coincides with a nation (Weiler: 1999, 337). Now, while EU citizen-
ship was introduced5 with the purpose of enhancing ‘European iden-
tity’ understood as the Europeans’ sense of belonging to their politi-
cal community (Weiler: 1999, 333), such citizenship originated at 
least two problems.
The first problem was: What demos is EU citizenship based on? Is 
there a European GHPRV ‘People’? What happens then with the na-
tions–peoples, GHPRL²of the member-states? Was there not supposed 
to be an ‘ever closer union’ among the SHRSOHVof Europe (Preamble 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union 2004)?
The second problem was this: If citizens are by definition mem-
bers of a political community, of what kind of polity do the new 
?? ???????????????????? ?????????????????????????
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European citizens become members? And how does that polity rela-
te to the existing member-states? Does it substitute them or assume 
them as in a federation? Is it a new kind of polity? Some have called 
this the telos problem.6
,QWKHEHJLQQLQJQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\DQGFLWL]HQVKLS
There were voices of concern about the creation of a European citi-
zenship (Miller: 1998, Smith: 1992, Kymlicka: 2001, Offe: 2006, 
Grimm: 2005) reminding that citizenship had its place in nation-
states, which are about the largest communities within which the 
identitarian (membership, belongingness) aspect of citizenship still 
makes sense. EU citizenship implied the creation of another demos 
whose telos (a super-nation) either threatened European nation-
states or simply was not going to work (Miller 1998, 49). This posi-
tion is insightful of the way in which citizenship has been devised and 
has worked in contemporary democracies (Miscevic: 2005). There is 
a strong link between national identity and citizenship. 
Membership in a polity confers rights, implies duties of par-
ticipation and makes citizens ‘part of the club’. Citizenship creates 
a bond of unity between the members of the political community: 
all of them possess equal rights, are ruled and rule through political 
participation, and can develop a sense of belonging among stran-
gers without threat to what makes each of them different (Leydet: 
2006). In other words, citizenship successfully allows the fulfillment 
of unity in diversity. Yet there are certain elements that contribute to 
the political community’s shared identity: a language that everybody 
speaks, a common history, a landscape, perhaps a religious tradition, 
and others. 
But Europe is too big and its member states (and peoples) are 
too diverse to make citizenship workable. For people across Eu-
rope ‘the nation remains [the] primary focus of political identity 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????
third and no less important problem, that of the ethos of integration.  
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and allegiance’ (Miller: 1998, 49). Democracy will only be possible 
where all sections of society have a voice in public discussion. This 
is very difficult without a common language (English is spoken as a 
second language by the elites, not by all Europeans). Besides,
for democratic decision making to work successfully, each 
participating group must be willing to moderate its own de-
mands in order to reach a compromise that everyone can 
accept… when a decision has been reached, those…in…
minority…must be willing to comply with the outcome, 
knowing that their point of view has at least been taken seri-
ously, and that on future occasions they may find themselves 
on the winning side. All this requires confidence in, and un-
derstanding of, those one disagrees with politically. Trust of 
this kind is much more likely to exist among people who 
share a common national identity, speak a common language, 
and have overlapping cultural values (Miller: 1998, 48). 
At the same time, social justice requires people to restrain their own 
demands, be fair in their dealings with, and make sacrifices for, other 
members of the political community. But 
what can motivate people to make the sacrifices that social 
justice requires, whether this takes the form of supporting 
parties that promise redistribution, or simply behaving in a 
fair way in their everyday lives? There is a wealth of evidence 
that shows that people are more willing to make such sacri-
fices the more closely they feel themselves tied to the likely 
beneficiaries of their actions…, people are more likely to 
afford equal treatment to others with whom they share a 
common identity or common values… From this point of 
view, nationhood is a very important source of common 
identity… (Miller: 1998, 48).
From this perspective, EU citizenship presents poor prospects. But 
these reflections deserve attention since they are based on what has 
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been the experience of citizenship so far, much more successful in 
national states than in multi-national ones. 
Two approaches argue for citizenship beyond the nation-state. 
They involve different ideas about the demos and the telos questions. 
We will look first at the one that seems to have more adherents in 
the academic literature.
3RVWQDWLRQDOFLWL]HQVKLS
Postnationalists (Habermas, Fossum: 2003, Delanty: 1997, 2007; 
Longo: 2008)7 see EU citizenship as a new, cosmopolitan form of 
belonging, which protects Europe from the dark risks of nation-
alism–all too evident in its recent history–and sets the conditions 
for ‘the people of Europe’–its GHPRV²to build a post-national pol-
ity WHORV through deliberation and attachment to civic values. EU 
citizenship ought to be enhanced from its present form into a fully-
fledged post-national citizenship (Habermas: 2001a, 2001b, 2006). 
For Habermas the emergence of a ‘Federal States of Europe’–a post-
national polity on the way to global governance–is possible only if 
political communities can form a collective identity beyond national 
borders, thus grounding the conditions of legitimacy for a ‘postna-
tional democracy’ (2001b, 90). European citizens will have to learn 
‘to mutually recognize one another as members of a common poli-
tical existence beyond national borders’ (Habermas: 2001b, 98) in 
such a way that ‘Swedes and Portuguese are prepared to stand up 
for each other’, exercising a ‘civil solidarity that leads to the setting 
of–for example–roughly equivalent minimum wages’ (Habermas: 
2003, 97). Against sceptics signalling to the impossibility of a ‘Euro-
pean people’ being created, Habermas points out that such an enter-
prise is difficult only if ‘people’ depends on a ‘pre-political commu-
nity of fate’ (a nation), who are solidary to each other because a state 
?? ? ???????????????????????????
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authority imposes on them that duty which they place above their 
own preferences (2001b, 101). For Habermas, however, there is 
…a remarkable dissonance between the rather archaic fea-
tures of the ‘obligation potential’ shared by comrades of fate 
who are willing to make sacrifices, on the one hand, and the 
normative self-understanding of the modern constitutional 
state as an uncoerced association of legal consociates, on 
the other… This picture fits poorly with an enlightenment 
culture whose normative core consists in the abolition of a 
publicly demanded VDFULÀFLXPas an element of morality. The 
citizens of a democratic legal state understand themselves as 
the authors of the law, which compels them to obedience as 
its addressees. Unlike morality, positive law construes duties 
as something secondary; they arise only from the compat-
ibility of the rights of each other with the equal rights of all 
(Habermas: 2001b, 101).
Habermas recognizes the nation as ‘the first modern form of col-
lective identity’ (2001b), yet the different paths that the emergence 
of nation-states took in Europe–from state to nation (for example 
France) or from nation to state (for example Germany)–attest ‘to 
the constructed character of this new identity formation’ (Haber-
mas: 2001b, 101). Civic solidarity among strangers was generated 
thanks to ‘a highly abstractive leap from the local and dynastic to 
national and then to democratic consciousness’: so...
...why shouldn’t this learning process be able to continue? 
...different expectations would mutually stimulate and sup-
port each other in a circular process. The legitimation pro-
cess has to be supported by a European party system that can 
develop to the degree that existing political parties, at first 
in their own respective national arenas, initiate a debate on 
the future of Europe and in the process articulate interests 
that cross national borders. And this debate, in turn, has to 
find resonance in a pan-European political public sphere that 
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presupposes a European civil society complete with interest 
groups, non-governmental organizations, citizens’ move-
ments, and so forth… The normative impulses that first set 
these different processes in motion from their scattered na-
tional sites will themselves only come about through over-
lapping projects for a common political culture. But these 
projects can be constructed in the common historical ho-
rizon that the citizens of Europe already find themselves in 
(Habermas: 2001b, 103).
Habermas sees in the experiences of overcoming particularisms and 
conflicts among Europeans, successful forms of social integration 
that have shaped ‘the normative self-understanding of European mo-
dernity into an egalitarian universalism’ and can ease the transition 
to postnational democracy for ‘all of us–we, the sons, daughters, and 
grand-children of a barbaric nationalism’ (Habermas: 2001b, 103). 
&RVPRSROLWDQFRPPXQLWDULDQLVWFLWL]HQVKLS
Cosmopolitan communitarianists (Bellamy, Castiglione, Weiler, Wal-
reigh) take a middle position between nationalism and postnational-
ism. To them EU citizenship should be perfected in its present form 
but not substantially changed. Existing alongside the national one, EU 
citizenship allows citizens to maintain their main source of political 
identification–belonging to their respective nations–and at the same 
time opens for them the benefits of a supranational atmosphere.8 
If Europe is to maintain the richness of its diversity it should 
continue on the path of a ‘mixed commonwealth’ (MacCormick: 
1997)–neither an intergovernmental organisation, like in the past, 
nor a federation, as some envisage its future (Bellamy & Walreigh: 
1998b, 447)–with several demoi, drawing from the different cultur-
al, linguistic and legal traditions of the member-states and, at the 
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????????????
156
same time, keeping each other in check as a way to avoid the dangers 
of nationalism. EU citizenship should be kept and perfected in its 
present form (Bellamy: 1998 & 2008b). 
Bellamy argues that the EU’s ‘hybridity can be sustained and de-
veloped by supplementing the elite-driven process and granting a 
greater political role to EU citizens’ (ibid). As the normative foun-
dation of this multilevel polity he proposes an ¶HWKLFV RI SDUWLFLSD-
WLRQ«[n]either supranationally cosmopolitan nor communitarianly 
state-centric’ (Bellamy & Walreigh: 1998b, 448) but a ‘cosmopolitan 
communitarianism’ (ibid), attending to the original inspiration con-
tained in the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome, that of ‘an ever closer 
union among the SHRSOHVof Europe’.9 In other words, he proposes ‘to 
leave the distinct peoplehood of the various Member States intact’ 
(Bellamy: 2006, 118). 
He was against the ‘creation’ of a constitution in 2003 because 
it already existed (in the DFTXLVFRPPXQDXWDLUHor body of treaties, 
combining ‘a neo-republican form of governance with the evolution 
of a European common law, better suited to the EU’s character as 
an evolving polity’ that ‘ought to be improved and enhanced, not 
replaced’ (Bellany: 2006, 118). 
For Bellamy, the degree of belonging necessary 
…to create an EU-wide demos is lacking, and rights provide 
an inadequate basis to fill this gap… How can then demo-
cratic participation on EU matters be meaningfully creat-
ed? The answer, I suggest, lies in grasping the nettle posed 
by the EU’s poly-centric polity and multi-levelled regime. 
They provide the basis for shifting from demos-cracy to…
demoi-cracy… For a demoi-cracy to work, far more Euro-
pean policies should be debated at the national and, where 
appropriate, sub-national level and mechanisms created that 
give these bodies the ability to review the allocation of com-
petences. In other words, we need European politics to be 
?? ? ??????????
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brought down to the levels that make sense for people–to 
where they belong… After all…European politics currently 
works in this fashion, with European issues being framed by 
national political debates rather than becoming the focus of 
transnational movements (Bellamy: 2008b, 608).
Political participation of EU citizens should be seen as ‘nested in, 
rather than autonomous from, national citizenship’, since ‘demo-
cratic legitimacy is largely lent to the EU through the old forms of 
democratic citizenship that prevail in the member states’:
Given that there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of 
the EU developing adequate…mechanisms of its own, Eu-
ropean citizenship must continue to be but an adjunct to 
national citizenship. Bringing the one more firmly under the 
scrutiny of the other, particularly with regard to decisions 
by the Court and other unelected bodies, and to some de-
gree limiting the scope for European integration itself, pro-
vides the only viable way to enhance democracy within the 
EU (Bellamy: 2008b, 609).
A truly common dimension will grow only if the European project 
respects and works in nations, not if it tries to do away with them: 
Paradoxically, the EU will only be treated seriously by or-
dinary citizens if they see it as an intrinsic part of domestic 
politics–as nested within the polities and regimes of Mem-
ber States, rather than attempting to become a polity in its 
own right (Bellamy: 2006, 128). 
In clear disagreement with Habermas regarding the demos question, 
Bellamy points out that there is no common European language and 
hence no pan-European media. Partially because of that, there is 
no shared political culture: in fact, concepts such as ‘democracy’, 
‘liberty’, ‘equality’, and others are understood differently in each 
member-state. Finally, within a vast electorate, ‘in the absence of a 
??????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????????????
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common language and culture of politics and hence of any meaning-
ful European public sphere’ citizens feel disempowered: ‘size mat-
ters’ (Bellamy: 2006, 123-124). 
The ‘EU quasi-polity’ characterised as a ‘mixed-commonwealth’ 
means for Bellamy, the ongoing interaction between the polities 
and regimes of the member-states reflected in an EU that is, at the 
same time, national, supranational and transnational (Bellamy: 2006, 
126). For him, ‘the post-national’ position
…is of itself too thin to generate allegiance to any polity in 
particular and, hence, once it moves beyond a general hu-
manitarianism most communitarians would accept, it will al-
ways have a tendency to merge into supranationalism…this 
is what happens in Habermas’ case. In seeking to flesh out 
his argument as a distinctively ‘European’ [one]…his thesis 
loses certain of its postnational [cosmopolitan] credentials… 
Habermas has greatly exaggerated both the degree of system 
and value convergence within the European Union and the 
extent to which ‘political’ and ‘national’ values can be sepa-
rated… (Belllamy & Castiglione: 2004, 189-190).
Whatever the concept used to talk about citizenship and the relat-
ed polity, Bellamy abides always in the realm of the ‘national’ (e.g. 
‘supra-national’, ‘trans-national’), whereas Habermas shifts atten-
tion towards a ‘post-national’ kind of citizenship and polity. Which of 
them is more desirable for Europe? Given that a European citizenship 
and a polity of sorts already exist, what colour ought they to take, 
cosmopolitan communitarianist or postnational? That depends on 
the key criterion one applies. To this I turn in the following section. 
EU citizenship: an analogical reading
The criterion I suggest for assessing the normative value of the two 
contending proposals is the desire of the great majority of Euro-
peans–synthesised in the EU motto–of having a ‘Europe united in 
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diversity’.10 But how should it be interpreted? How is it different, 
for instance, from an apparently similar motto, H SOXULEXV XQXP 
adopted by the United States of America" In order to find out, I 
would like to suggest a reading of the EU motto–and consequently 
also of citizenship and the polity–that is ‘analogical’, in the sense in 
which Mauricio Beuchot uses this adjective.
Beuchot’s proposal has sprouted in the field of interpretation (her-
meneutics) of linguistic and non-linguistic (Ramberg & Gjesdal: 
2005) expressions. Based among others on certain classical and 
contemporary thinkers (Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Heidegger, 
Pierce, Wittgenstein, Paz, Gadamer, Eco, Ricoeur), Beuchot has 
sought to offer a middle ground between two opposing theories of 
interpretation: ‘univocism’ and ‘equivocism’ (Beuchot: 2005a, 21). 
Univocist interpretation would have been used in classical positiv-
ism–John Stuart Mill–, neo-positivism–Carnap–and logical posi-
tivism–Quine, Hilary Putnam. Equivocist interpretation would be 
found in romanticism–Schleiermacher–and relativism–Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Rorty, and Derrida (Beuchot: 2004, 63; 2005a, 22-25, 97; 
2005b, 243-247; 2006, 22-24). Beuchot’s position lies in between. 
Against univocism, he denies that there is a unique and absolute in-
terpretation of ‘the text’. But against equivocism, he does not con-
cede that all interpretations are incommensurable and equally valid. 
He claims that certain interpretations are closer to the true meaning 
of the text than others, and that such interpretations can be ordered 
accordingly in a hierarchy–by analogy (Beuchot: 2006, 15-17). 
For the nearly five hundred million EU citizens today, their na-
tional cultures, languages, history, and political, religious and legal 
traditions, are a treasure that the European project ought to cherish 
and respect. From the outset they joined the common enterprise on 
this assumption. The overwhelming majority of them identify first 
with their own nations and only secondarily–if at all–with ‘Europe’ 
or (even less) ‘the EU’. Most of them are happy with the EU as an 
enhancement of their national spheres, but never DVDVXEVWLWXWHThe 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????
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European motto, if it is to mean anything to EU citizens, ought to 
reflect this fact and therefore should not be read as proposing to 
make ‘one out of many’–11a melting pot–with the stress on the side 
of unity; but rather to create a weaker unity, one befallen ‘in diver-
sity’, with the stress on the latter.
Borrowing from Beuchot’s insights, I would like to submit that 
EU unity, citizenship and polity should be regarded as ‘analogical’. 
Analogical to what? To the national referent. In other words, the 
unity of the EU polity should be analogical to the one of the nations, 
though weaker. EU citizenship should provide a collective identity, 
a sense of belonging, but subordinated or added to national citizen-
ships. The EU polity should be less defined, centralised and impor-
tant than the national polities. A model of citizenship and political 
unity for Europe ought to have an analogical character in this sense. 
Having this in mind, what kind of EU citizenship (and associated 
concept of polity) ought to be promoted, postnational or cosmo-
politan communitarianist? In the next section I will try to show that 
the cosmopolitan communitarianist option agrees better with what 
Europeans want and the EU motto expresses, and is therefore more 
desirable than the postnational alternative. 
Cosmopolitan communitarianist citizenship: the lesser evil?
Postnational citizenship is aimed at ridding Europe of nationalism–
often root of bloody conflicts in the region–and at creating a com-
mon demos with the related postnational polity. Under a cosmopolitan 
communitarianist citizenship, nationalism is allowed to continue ex-
isting, while its excesses are kept in check through a balance between 
the different demoi of the mixed polity. Which one is more desirable?
Departing from the premise that Europe cherishes its diversity 
and that national traditions and values must be preserved as ele-
ments not only of cultural richness, but also as the see of the citizens’ 
main political identity, the cosmopolitan communitarianist option 
11  As the American motto would appear to suggest.
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seems better. It does not destroy or ‘overcome’ national identities–
Europe’s diversity–in the name of a postnational situation which not 
only does not correspond with the reality of Europe, but promises 
very weak allegiances–if any–from ordinary Europeans. 
Nationalism–the exaggeration of nationality–with the pretence 
that it makes a people not only particular (as in ‘different’) but VXSH-
rior to others, ought of course to be rejected. But does that render 
nations–and nation-states–a thing of the past? Not necessarily. Na-
tionality–let us distinguish it from ‘nationalism’–carries with itself a 
great richness expressed in many ways: language, legal and religious 
traditions, history, political systems and so on. Furthermore, nation-
states have proved to be an effective form of political organisation. 
Postnationalists run the risk of pursuing unity by cancelling di-
versity. Because nationality has had excesses, they purport to uproot 
it altogether. Cosmopolitan communitarianism proceeds from the 
fact that nations are a reality in Europe. Most Europeans (except 
maybe for small elites) draw their collective identity (political and 
otherwise) much more from their nation than from ‘Europe’. A 
project that understands diversity and looks for ways to coordinate 
such diversity politically, promises to be hard and messy, but so has 
European integration been from its beginnings. That is the price of 
preserving diversity.12
True, the kind of unity that can be derived from postnationalism 
would be stronger and clearer than the one coming from cosmopoli-
tan communitarianism: ‘postnational federation’–even if grounded 
on an identity perceived as thin–sounds a lot more defined than 
‘mixed-commonwealth’ or–still worse–‘quasi-polity’. Yet this cor-
responds better with the reality of the European project as it has 
unfolded, and–more importantly–with the great richness of the Eu-
ropean nations–‘the peoples of Europe’.
However if collective identity is a problem in the case of postna-
tionalism, which proposes to create a postnational GHPRVit becomes 
an even more acute difficulty in the case of cosmopolitan commu-
nitarianism. How can unity exist among different peoples without 
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them fusing into a single people? How can the national citizen re-
main such and still have some allegiance to a larger political com-
munity? How can a mixed commonwealth that encompasses several 
peoples still be RQH"And what kind of identity would it have? This 
problem is considered in the next and last section.  
Challenges: identity, unity and the common language
The cosmopolitan communitarianist option, as we have seen, is 
messy and imperfect. It does not create a clear-cut polity with a 
proper name (‘federation’ for example). It is not ‘univocal’–ex-
trapolating Beuchot’s terms. Neither does it, however, renounce to 
some kind of European unity, to a possible commonality among di-
verse members. It is not completely ‘equivocal’. Bellamy’s ‘cosmo-
politan communitarianism’ (Bellamy & Castiglione: 2004) respects 
diversity, but it still proposes some kind of unity. Not overriding 
(‘univocal’ unity) or completely relativised and dissolved (‘equivo-
cal’ unity), but  analogical, with an analogical citizenship and identi-
ty (not strong but still existent) and an analogical polity (polycentric 
and multilevelled, but still a polity–or at least a ‘quasi-polity’). 
One of the challenges is to specify how unity can be created and 
maintained, and if the cohesion of the mixed (or could we say, analog-
ical?) commonwealth requires some shared values or culture, even 
if in very basic terms. Unity in this polity relies on certain sacrifices 
of national sovereignty. But are those sacrifices not made under the 
assumption that others will do the same, that ‘we’ (each European 
nation) can trust ‘them’ (the other European nations)? And can that 
be grounded only on a body of treaties (the ‘mobile constitution’ of 
the EU) or do they rely on deeper, pre-political moral suppositions? 
Friese & Wagner (2002, 335) wonder if Bellamy ‘and others’ are not 
taking agreement about Europeanness for granted, disregarding thus 
the question of any substantive orientation of the polity: because if 
that is true, ‘…they may indeed join Habermas’ (ibid). 
This could be one of the strongest objections to the cosmopoli-
tan communitarianist proposal: if a demos is not created, if the demoi 
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are maintained in their valuable diversity, what is going to unite Eu-
ropeans? What will make them trust each other for the necessary 
arrangements and sacrifices of sovereignty that even this mixed-
commonwealth implies? 
Certainly the first step for the emergence of the most basic col-
lective identity and unity in contemporary democratic polities is the 
presence of a common language. But due to its nature, the EU can-
not have a common language because national languages are part 
of the diversity citizens want to maintain. Here Beuchot’s concepts 
might come handy. How about a common ground for communica-
tion that is not a proper language, but a language of sorts, an ‘ana-
logical language’, which therefore does not threaten the existence of 
the European national languages?
Due to lack of space I cannot fully explore that idea here. All I 
can do is to hint to a possibility that could serve as an example of 
potential candidates for that common language of sorts.13 For this, I 
would like to recall a few of the thoughts alluded to at the beginning 
of this paper.
Ratzinger referred to the moral, pre-political common ground 
provided in Europe by Christianity, not in its denominational form 
but in its principles. This common ground is shared by all of the 
member-states in the EU. Christianity could be an analogical ‘lan-
guage’ since it is already there, embedded in the national mentali-
ties; it would not have to be created. In the words of atheist philoso-
pher Marcello Pera,
I agree that we must commit to defending certain basic 
values, principles, and institutions, such as human dignity 
(a Christian concept), heterosexual marriage and the fam-
ily (a biological and natural concept), and respect for other 
religions (a cultural concept that gained ground in Europe 
especially after the religious wars)… This is not enough, 
13  This is an interesting avenue of research, but by no means the only one. Elsewhere I 
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however. We need to search for a broader and deeper spirit, 
a general conceptual framework for these values, princi-
ples and institutions, and a common feeling that gives them 
breathing room, cultural weight, and the force of custom 
(Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 94-95).
Pera continues to suggest that the work of making that common 
language more evident should be done ‘by Christians and secularists 
together’:
What we need today is a FLYLOUHOLJLRQthat can instill its val-
ues throughout the long chain that goes from the individual 
to the family, groups, associations, the community, and civil 
society, ZLWKRXWpassing through the political parties, govern-
ment programs, and force of states, and therefore without 
affecting the separation, in the temporal sphere, between 
church and state. In Europe and in the West so enriched by 
Europe, such a religion would already be Christian by na-
ture…What I am suggesting is therefore a non-denomination-
DO&KULVWLDQUHOLJLRQ«(Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 95-96).
Pera’s ‘civil religion’ is ‘natural to the state’:
The modern democratic and social state is especially pater-
nalistic and moral. In its desire to care for its citizens (from 
cradle, if not sooner, to grave), it must necessarily adopt 
and safeguard within its own public sphere many values that 
are widespread in the private sphere of individuals, groups, 
or categories. A non-denominational Christian religion is 
therefore both private and public. Private, because of the 
faith of the individuals who profess it. Public, because it is 
the common spirit and feeling of the civil society that it sus-
tains (Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 97). 
The concept of a ‘civil religion’ is complex and I do not intend to 
explain it or even less to assess it here. I just mention it as one among 
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many possible answers to a problem that needs to be addressed by 
the cosmopolitan communitarianist perspective. 
Certainly, the moral background that springs from Christian-
ity (or from a broader Biblical tradition that encompasses the three 
great monotheistic religions, perhaps?) is common to all of the EU 
countries. Pera recalls John Adams’ words about the American con-
stitution having been ‘made only for a moral and religious people’. 
Ratzinger quotes Tocqueville as saying ‘Despotism may govern with-
out faith, but liberty cannot’ (Ratzinger & Pera: 2007, 109). That in 
United States the existence of a basic, non-denominational religious 
and moral consensus based on Christianity is easier to see than in 
Europe is another problem (ibid) which demands a separate analysis. 
For Jewish Professor Joseph Weiler, the role and possible use-
fulness of Christianity in the construction of ‘Europe’ has received 
surprisingly little attention in the academic literature about Euro-
pean integration (Weiler: 2003, 47-48). The European project has 
never been one concerned simply with the creation of a free-market 
region, but possesses the aspiration to build an ‘ethical community’. 
The Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty declared the desire to 
continue a path of civility, progress and prosperity for all its inhabit-
ants (Weiler: 2003, 45). Europe’s memory, its history, that provides 
it with an identity, the basis for the union of its demoi upon an HWKRV
and a WHORVhas always had the presence of Christianity (Weiler, 2003: 
45). Christianity cannot be erased even from Europe’s contempo-
rary history (Weiler: 2003, 46). It has influenced Europe’s political 
culture, ideas, values and morality (Weiler: 2003, 44). 
Bellamy’s conception still needs a common–even if analogical–
language. Weiler coincides with Bellamy regarding the demos and the 
telos questions, but not the HWKRVone, which could probably offer a 
path to make cosmopolitan communitarianism a stronger position. 
In this paper I have sought to normatively ponder two approach-
es to EU citizenship and argue for the one that seems more desirable. 
Additionally, I have suggested a new reading of that option, which 
might broaden the understanding of its original meaning. Finally, I 
have outlined challenges and suggested possible avenues of future 
research to face them. 
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